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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
ROBERT L. HEYWOOD,
Plaintiff,

vs.
Case No.
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY,
a corporation,

8508

Defendant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff, Robert L. Heywood, commenced this suit in
the District Court of Salt Lake County on December 11,
1954, to recover for injuries sustained in The Denver and
Rio Grande Western Railroad Company's blacksmith shop
at Salt Lake City, Utah, on November 23, 1953. The complaint alleges a cause of action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act grounded on alleged negligent failure
of defendant to furnish plaintiff a reasonably safe place to
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work and other specific acts and omissions of negligence.
The defendant's answer denies negligence and affirmatively
alleges that plaintiff's accident and injuries were caused
by his own negligence.
The case came on for trial before the Honorable David
T. Lewis on January 23, 1956, sitting with a jury. A jury
verdict was returned on January 24, 1956, in favor of plaintiff and against defendant assessing damages in the total
amount of $13,000.00. The trial court denied a motion by
defendant for a directed verdict. Judgment was entered on
the verdict on January 25, 1956.
Thereafter, defendant made a motion for a new trial
on the grounds, among others, of errors in law committed
by the court in its instructions to the jury. Said motion
was heard and argued on May 13, 1956. The trial court
denied said motion.
Whereupon, defendant commenced this appeal assigning as error the following:
1.

Denial of defendant's motion for directed verdict.

2. Error in the trial court's instructions to the jury
including denial of certain of defendant's requested instructions.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff, Robert L. Heywood, was 63 years of age
at the time of trial. His lifetime occupation was that of a
railroad machinist (R. 13). He had worked for The Denver
and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company as a machinist
since November 2, 1922. His duties as a machinist con-
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3
sisted of repair and maintenance of machines and equipment including work in the railroad blacksmith shop. He
was generally familiar with the blacksmith shop and had
worked in it since 1922 (R. 14). He styled himself a "trouble shooter." He testified that the work of a trouble shooter
was to repair any machine used by the railroad whethe,r
it be a steam hammer or truck or whatever else it might
be (R. 15). Part of his duties consisted of determining the
cause of trouble and correcting the same (R. 43, 44). Mr.
Heywood was a senior mechanic at the time of his accident
(R. 57). He testified that he. knew of no one more experienced than himself in working with equipment nor more
qualified to inspect the type of equipment involved in his
accident (R. 57, 58). He had replaced packing in the stuffing boxes on hammers on numerous occasions (R. 29). He
had worked on the stuffing box involved in this accident
four or five times before the accident (R. 131).
Plaintiff's accident occurred in defendant's blacksmith
shop at the site of what is known as the single arch steam
hammer at approximately 11:45 a. m., November 23, 1953
(R. 2, 16). The blacksmith shop is a large, high ceiling
building used to house hammers and other blacksmith
equipment utilized in maintenance repair work. It is located
approximately 750 feet from the railroad boiler room (R.
19, 20).
The single arch hammer involved in the accident is
shown in Exhibits 1, 2 and 3. These exhibits were identified by plaintiff (R. 16). The single arch hammer is a
large piece of equipment used to fashion large pieces of
metal taken from the forges. The hammer is located on a
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cement slab in the blacksmith shop. The part of the hammer upon which the metal is placed is known as the die
(R. 18). Metal is placed on the die with tongs. Operation
of the hammer is controlled by two levers. One lever controls the stroke and the other lever controls the steam. The
hammer is powered by steam (R. 18).
Steam is made in the power house located about one
block from the blacksmith shop. There are three steam
boilers in the power house (R. 19). A main steam line runs
from the boilers in the power house to various localities,
one of which is the blacksmith shop (R. 19, 20). A system
of three-inch standard pipes are used to carry the steam.
A main steam line runs from the power house into the
blacksmith shop and along the ceiling of the blacksmith
shop to the center thereof. A feeder line extends from the
center of the blacksmith shop to the single arch hammer.
An intermediate shutoff valve is located at the center of
the blacksmith shop and controls the supply of steam to
the hammer (R. 93). Another shutoff valve is located
about two feet from the hammer (R. 9-1).
Exhibits 1, 2 and 3 show the end of the steam pipe
connecting with the single arch hammer.
The steam pipe (from the point of supply) connects
with the single arch hammer at a point approximately 12
feet from the ground (R. 21). The connection is enclosed
in a stuffing box. The stuffing box is approximately two
feet from the closest shutoff valve (R. 21). The stuffing
box is used because of vibration. A rigid connection between the steam line and the machine would be impractic-
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able because of vibration. The purpose of the stuffing box
is to provide a flexible joint (R. 21). The steam pipe leading into the stuffing box (from the point of supply) has
a collar or flange on the end. Asbestos hemp packing is
placed upon and around the collar and held tight by a gland
to prevent steam leaking (R. 21). Exhibit 4 was identified
at the time of trial and admitted in evidence as a model of
a stuffing box and the pipe leading into it (R. 24). The
gland fits around the pipe and is attached and held in place
by four bolts ( R. 25) . The asbestos hemp packing has to
be replaced from time to time as it deteriorates with use
(R. 26).
The evidence was uncontradicted that the end of the
pipe with the collar leading into the stuffing box could
not come out of the attached gland without the collar breaking (R. 30, 32, 68). A break in the collar could not be
detected by looking at the pipe from outside of the stuffing
box (R. 84, 113). The stuffing box concealed the collar.
A break at the joint of the collar could not be detected except by removing the pipe leading into the stuffing box
(from the source of supply) (R. 69, 70, 78, 138).
With this setting in mind, we turn to the facts surrounding the accident.
On the morning of the accident, lVIr. Lewis Morgan
Griffiths, a blacksmith in defendant's shop, had been working on the single arch hammer. He discovered that there
was a steam leak in the hammer and reported it to Mr.
Paul Schenk, the foreman (R. 87, 150). Mr. Schenk notified the plaintiff to repair the leak (R. 150, 15). According
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to plaintiff, Mr. Schenk told him to go out and fix the leak
on the hammer (R. 16). Plaintiff commenced work on the
hammer at approximately 10:30 a. m. (R. 47). Plaintiff
had a helper to assist him in doing whatever was necessary
in the course of his work (R. 47, 48). There were other
men to help if help was needed (R. 48). There were also
four pipe fitters available on the day of the accident to
help if needed (R. 109). Plaintiff had a Ys-inch S wrench
and a 14-inch Stillson wrench with him. There were ladders, scaffolds and other equipment available in the shop
to do the work (R. 49).
When plaintiff approached the stuffing box on the
single arch hammer, he observed that it was leaking so
badly that new packing would be required (R. 26). Plaintiff turned off the valve closest to the machine (R. 27).
He took the gland off the stuffing box and slid it back onto
the pipe. He took out one ring of the packing and discovered the size packing required. Mr. Schenk was not
in the blacksmith shop at that time (R. 27). Mter some
delay, plaintiff found the packing he needed and returned
to the hammer (R. 28). He placed the new packing in the
stuffing box, replaced the gland and tightened the gland
to what he thought was the proper tension. He was standing on a ladder about six feet from the ground. He then
turned on the valve letting steam through the line (R. 29).
As he started down the ladder, the steam pipe going into
the stuffing box blew out and hit him on the left hand.
The pipe came out of the stuffing box. Plaintiff fell and
hit the floor. He was standing when he landed with the
weight on his left leg (R. 30). Other workmen came to
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his assistance. He did not have an opportunity thereafter
to examine the stuffing box or the pipe (R. 31).
On cross-examination plaintiff admitted that one of
his duties was to inspect the work to see if it was done
satisfactorily (R. 43, 44). He admitted that part of his
job was to determine the trouble and to correct it (R. 44).
He admitted that he made no effort to ascertain if the
collar on the pipe was broken (R. 45, 46, 47, 55, 58). He
didn't know whether the collar was broken or not (R. 37).
He made no examination to see the condition of the collar
before he tightened the gland (R. 68).
Plaintiff denied any knowledge of the existence or
function of the intermediate valve (R. 50, 51, 52). He
admitted that he had tried to tighten the gland and had
tightened it all the way without success (R. 54, 55). He
admitted that there was no better opportunity to inspect the
equipment than when same was dismantled and that he
had not made an inspection at that time (R. 56). He admitted that he had not asked any one to make an inspection
at the time the stuffing box was dismantled (R. 56). He
did not arrange to have a pipe fitter take the pipe off and
inspect it (R. 84). He testified that it was not too big a
job to dismantle the pipe (R. 84). He admitted that steam
fitters were not so far away that one could not be obtained
(R. 84). He admitted that if he saw something requiring
a steam fitter that he could call his supervisor (R. 85).
He admitted that he never went to the supervisor on this
occasion to tell him to have a steam fitter examine the pipe,
although on other occasions he had done so (R. 85).
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There was no evidence offered or received that anyone other than plaintiff ever went up to the stuffing box
and examined the condition. Presumably plaintiff was in
a better position than anyone else to determine the trouble
and decide what work should be done and what assistance
obtained.
One of defendant's witnesses, Mr. Paul Schenk, foreman, testified that it was the machinist's job in the first
instance to inspect the machine to see what had to be done
(R. 151, 157). This testimony was not disputed by plaintiff despite the fact that plaintiff was recalled after Mr.
Schenk testified. There was no evidence of any custom
or practice for a steam fitter to precede a machinist in an
examination of equipment nor for a steam fitter to accompany a machinist to the work.
One of the witnesses called by defendant was James
Everett Aberton, Division Locomotive Foreman (R. 135,
136) . Mr. Aberton arrived at the scene of the accident
shortly thereafter. He examined the pipe and collar involved in the accident. At the trial he identified Exhibit
6 as the pipe and collar involved in the accident (R. 136,
137). Mr. Aberton found that there was an old break between the collar and the pipe all the way around the pipe
except for approximately %~-inch (R. 37). He was able
to determine that the break was old because of discoloration
(R. 156). He stated that it was his opinion that there was
just a thread holding the pipe to the collar at the time Mr.
Heywood was performing his work (R. 137, 138). He
stated that the break in the collar would account for the
steam leak (R. 138, 139). He testified that the stress
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exerted by tightening the gland might be sufficient to break
the remaining portion of the pipe from the collar (R. 142).
Plaintiff called witness Joseph L. Crowton. Mr. Crowton was an experienced sheet metal worker and pipe fitter
(R. 100, 101). Mr. Crowton examined Exhibit 6, the pipe
and collar, at the time of trial. He testified that he had
seen the pipe on the single arch hammer a good many times
(R. 111). He testified that from his experience he could
look at the break between the collar and pipe and determine
whether it was a fresh or old break because of rust. He
testified that the break appeared to him to be of old duration except for a distance of approximately o/s-inch. This
was based on the rust which appeared on the break ( R.
111). Mr. Crowton testified that little pressure would be
required to separate the collar from the pipe with such a
large break (R. 113).
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 6
WHICH IMPOSED ABSOLUTE LIABILITY ON
DEFENDANT.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 7
WHICH INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON A
THEORY CONTRARY TO AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
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POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 8
WHICH INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON A
THEORY NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN ITS REFUSAL AND FAILURE TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 1, 8 AND 11 OR SOME
INSTRUCTION SETTING FORTH IN FULL
THE THEORIES CONTAINED THEREIN.

POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN FAILING AND REFUSING
TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 6 OR SOME OTHER INSTRUCTION INCORPORATING THE THEORY
CONTAINED THEREIN.

POINT VI.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN FAILING AND REFUSING
TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 2.
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POINT VII.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED
VERDICT; THE EVIDENCE COMPELS THE
CONCLUSION THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW AND THAT
HIS NEGLIGENCE WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS ACCIDENT AND INJURIES.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 6
WHICH IMPOSED ABSOLUTE LIABILITY ON
DEFENDANT.
Instruction Number Six reads as follows :
"It is the duty of the defendant railroad company to exercise reasonable care to provide its employees with a reasonably safe place to work. This
duty does not require the absolute elimination of
all danger, but it does require the elimination of all
dangers which the exercise of reasonable care by
the defendant railroad company would remove or
guard against.

"In this connection you are instructed that if
you shall find from a preponderance of the evidence
that plaintiff at the time of his injury was performing the duties of his employment and that the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care to make
said place reasonably safe for the performance of
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such duties in that the position of the plaintiff in
connection with his duties and the operation of appliances used in the performance of his duties were
such that the plaintiff was not performing his duties
in a place of reasonable safety, then you are instructed that you may find the defendant negligent
in such regard; and if you further find from a preponderance of the evidence that such negligence on
the part of the defendant, if any, proximately caused
in whole or in part injuries to plaintiff, then you
should return a verdict in favor of plaintiff and
against the defendant and award to plaintiff damages as in these instructions set forth." (Emphasis
Added.)
This instruction must be considered in light of the
well-settled principles establishing a railroad's duty under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Liability under the
Act is predicated upon common law negligence. As stated
by this court in the recent decision, Clifton M. Bowden v.
The Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, 3
Utah 2d 444, 286 P. 2d 240:

"* * * We recognized then, and do now,
that 'the Federal Act does not make the railroad
an (absolute) insurer * * * the Act imposes
liability for negligent injuries. * * *' The test
to be applied in determining negligence is that of
reasonable care. * * * 'Ye also expressly recognized therein the necessity of actual or constructive knowledge, stating at page 334 of 233 P. 2d that
a defendant employer 'is charged with responsibility for conditions of danger * * * of which it
either has actual knowledge or is charged with constructive knowledge. * * *'"
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And in Lasagna v. McCarthy, 111 Utah 269, 177 P. 2d
734, 741, this court said:
"A recent case in point is that of McGivern v.
Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 132 F. 2d 213, at page 217,
wherein the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals stated the
rule in these words: '* * * The duty of providing a reasonably safe place in which to work and
reasonably safe appliances with which to work while
a continuing one does not obligate the employer to
keep the place of work safe at every moment where
such safety may depend on the due performance of
work by the servant and his fellow workmen. Kreigh
v. Westinghouse C., K. & Co., 214 U. S. 249, 29 S. Ct.
619, 53 L. Ed. 984. In fact the rule is held not to be
applicable where the workmen in the progress of
their work render the place unsafe. Torgerson v.
Minneapolis, St. P. & S. (S.) M. Ry. Co., 49 N. D.
1096, 194 N. W. 741; Cartwright v. Atchison, T. &
S. F. Ry. Co., 8 Cir., 228 F. 872. Temporary conditions created by employees using or failing to use
appliances furnished by the employer are not defects
for which the employer may be held responsible in
damages * * * ' For additional authority on
this point, see Morgan Construction Co. v. Frank,
6 Cir., 158 F. 964; and Medina Valley Irrigation Co.
v. Espino, 5 Cir., 214 F. 732.
"Negligence of the employer being the basis for
recovery under the Federal Employers' Liability Act,
it is well to return to the ordinary definition of the
term, which is (the omission to do something which
a reasonable person guided by those considerations
which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do; or the doing of something which
a prudent person under like circumstances would
not do. Viewing the appellants' conduct in the light
of this rule, we are unable to find anything in this
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record which in any way indicates that they omitted
to do that which they should have done; or that they
did that which they ought not to have done."
It is thus settled that to render an employer liable it

must be made to appear by the evidence that the employer
knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have
known of an unsafe condition and knew or should have
known that the condition exposed its employees to an unreasonable risk of harm. It is fundamental to common law
negligence, that not every risk of harm gives rise to liability; the risk must be unreasonable when viewed in light
of all circumstances.
The material facts which bear upon this point are as
follows : Plaintiff was, according to his own testimony, an
experienced machinist, having worked in the defendant's
machine shop since 1922. He was a "trouble shooter." He
knew when sent to perform the tasks out of which his
accident arose that there was a leak in the steam pipe
which required repairs. The manner of making repairs
was left to his discretion. Plaintiff had full discretion to
select tools and equipment. Ladders and scaffolds were
readily available. Plaintiff's accident and injuries were
caused by an old break in the collar of a steam pipe. At
all tin1es prior to the accident the said collar on the pipe
was concealed by a stuffing box which housed the collar
connection. Both plaintiff's witness and defendant's witness testified that the break in the collar appeared of old
duration. The break in the pipe was one which could not
have been detected without removing the pipe. The break
was not known to or detected by plaintiff in the course of
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his work. (Statement of Facts.) If there was anything
unsafe about plaintiff's place of work it was the condition
of said pipe.
It is the defendant's contentions that under these circumstances defendant would not be liable to plaintiff unless
defendant knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should
have known of the unsafe condition and knew or in the
exercise of reasonable care should have known that plaintiff was being exposed to an unreasonable risk of harm.
Further, as stated in the Lasagna and M eGivern decisions,
supra, the defendant would not be liable for temporary
conditions created by plaintiff using or failing to use ap. pliances furnished by defendant.
Instruction Number 6 is, considered in its best light,
an ambiguous and confusing instruction. The opening
paragraph of the instruction states an abstract proposition
of law. The second paragraph requires a grammatical
diagram to ascertain its meaning. If any sensible meaning
can be given said paragraph, it is as follows:
"If plaintiff was performing his duties and defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in that
the position of plaintiff was such that plaintiff was
not in a place of reasonable safety then defendant
was negligent."

It is the appellant's contention that the underlined
words "in that" qualify and restrict the meaning of the
preceding parts of the instruction. The same words have
been so construed in the following decisions :
Fraee v. Long Beach City High School, 58 C. A.
2d 566, 137 P. 2d 60.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16

Textile Work v. Richards, 245 Ala. 37, 15 S. 2d
578.
As stated by this court in University of Utah v. Richards, 20 Utah 457, 59 Pac. 96 in construing a Statute:

"* * * Particular provisions relating to a
former subject must govern in relation to that subject, as against general provisions in another part
of the law which might otherwise be broad enough
to include it. * * *"
This charge places the whole emphasis on whether the
place of work was safe rather than whether defendant
failed to exercise reasonable care. The charge instructs the
jury that defendant might be found negligent if plaintiff
was not performing his duties in a place of reasonable
safety-irrespective of whether the defendant knew or
should have known of the unsafe condition, whether defendant knew or should have known that the condition gave
rise to an unreasonable risk and whether defendant had
reasonable opportunity to correct said situation and failed
to do so. Under this instruction the jury might have found
the defendant liable even though it believed that the defendant did not know and would not in the exercise of reasonable care have known of the unsafe condition, did not
know and should not have realized an unreasonable risk, and
did not have an opportunity to correct the condition. Under
this instruction the jury could find the defendant liable even
though it believed from the evidence that the defendant
exercised reasonable care to correct the only unsafe condition of which it knew by sending plaintiff to perform
repairs.
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For the reasons stated the said instruction, ambiguous
as it is, contains a statement which is contrary to the law.
It could tend only to confuse and mislead the jury.
Appellant is fully aware of the rule which requires
that instructions be read and considered as a whole. The
question is whether the error contained in the second paragraph of Instruction 6 is saved by the first paragraph
or by the general definition of negligence contained else-.
where in the instructions. The difficulty with this latter
suggestion is that the second paragraph may be construed
to qualify and restrict all other parts of the instructions.
It would be entirely reasonable for a jury to apply such a
construction. It must be assumed that the jury read and
considered this instruction; and that the jurors may have
believed that if they found that plaintiff was performing
the duties of his employment and was not in a place of
reasonable safety that they might find defendant negligent.
In final analysis the question is not whether the jury
did in fact construe the instructions as aforesaid; the question is whether the jury may have construed the instructions in such manner to the prejudice of defendant. If the
jury may have been thus mislead the error is clear and
prejudicial.
There are a number of decisions, Federal and State,
in which instructions, similar to the instruction in question,
have been considered and held prejudicially erroneous.

Seaboard Airline Railway v. Horton, 233 U. S. 492
(1914), 34 Sup. Ct. 365, was a suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act founded upon failure to provide a
safe place to work. Plaintiff alleged that the· defendant
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was negligent, among other reasons, for failure to provide
him with a safe place to work in that the defendant furnished him with a locomotive engine not equipped with a
glass plate between the engineer's seat in the engine and
the boiler pressure gauge. The evidence was conflicting.
The case was submitted to a jury with verdict for plaintiff.
Judgment was entered on the verdict. Upon appeal by
defendant to the Supreme Court of North Carolina, judgment was affirmed. Appeal was taken to the Supreme
Court of the United States. Defendant assigned as error
certain instructions given by the trial court and the denial
of certain requested instructions. One of the instructions
was similar to the instruction given in the instant case:

"* * * It is the duty of the defendant to provide a reasonably safe place for the plaintiff to work
and to furnish him with reasonably safe appliances
with which to do the work. * * * If you find
from the evidence that it (the locomotive engine)
was turned over to him without the guard and if you
further find from the evidence that the guard was a
proper safety provision for the use of that gauge
and that it was unsafe without it, then the defendant
did not furnish him a safe place and a safe appliance
to do his work, and if it remained in that condition
it was continuing negligence on the part of the defendant, and if he was injured in consequence thereof, if you so find by the greater weight of the evidence, you should answer the first issue 'Yes.'"
The Supreme Court of the United States held that the
instruction constituted prejudicial error. The court said
that the jury was, in effect, erroneously instructed that the
absence of the guard glass was conclusive evidence of de-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
fendant's negligence. Likewise in this case the instruction
charges the jury that if the plaintiff was in an unsafe place,
defendant was negligent.
In Atlantic Coastline Railroad Company v. Dixon, 189
F. 2d 525 (1951 cert. den. 72 Sup. Ct. 54, 342 U. S. 830),
a similar instruction was held erroneous. The instruction
read:
"* * * 'I charge you, Gentlemen of the jury,
as a matter of law, if you find that the defendant
company required its servant, C. C. Dixon, to work
in a place which the railroad or its foreman knew to
be unsafe, or which the foreman in the exercise of
reasonable prudence ought to have known was unsafe, then the defendant is liable for the injuries to
its servant if those injuries resulted from an unsafe
and dangerous place to work, as alleged in the plaintiff's petition, and it would be your duty to return
a verdict for the plaintiff.' "
The court pinpointed the error as follows:
"This charge is faulty in that it presents, as the
sole criterion of liability, knowledge of the employer
or its representative that the place or tools provided
for the employee's use were unsafe, rather than the
failure on the part of the employer to exercise reasonable care and prudence to that end, which is the
recognized test. It should be modified to correctly
state the duty of the employer as hereinabove defined. * * *"
Another case involving the same question is Hat field

v. Thompson, 252 S. W. 2d 534 (Missouri 1952). That was
an action brought under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act. Plaintiff sustained injuries tripping over a hole in a
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path adjoining defendant's railroad tracks. Plaintiff alleged failure to provide a safe place to work. The case was
tried to a jury with verdict and judgment for plaintiff.
Defendant appealed claiming error in instructions. The
court's instruction number 1 permitted the jury to find that
defendant was negligent if a hole existed on the right of
way. None of the court's instructions required a finding
that defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the
defective condition. The Missouri Supreme Court held that
the instruction constituted prejudicial error :
"Neither of the instructions submitting plaintiff's case required the jury to find that defendant
had actual or constructive knowledge of the existence of the hole under which plaintiff's foot allegedly
slid. Such knowledge, actual or constructive, is unquestionably a prerequisite of defendant's liability.

* * *

*

*

*

*

"In this case we have held that the mere requirement of a finding that the existence of the hole
was negligence was not the equivalent of the required finding of knowledge. The instructions
omitted such a finding and were therefore prejudicially erroneous. * * *"

Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, et al. v. Burks, 196
Ark. 1104, 121 S. ,V. 2d 65, was a suit brought by a railroad employee against his employer for damages for personal injuries. Plaintiff claimed defendant negligently
failed to provide a safe place to work. Plaintiff's injuries
resulted from falling through a faulty and weakened floor
in a freight car. Appeal was taken by defendant from a
verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Instruction number 4
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charged the jury that if it found the floor of the freight
car was in an unsafe condition, which was known or by the
exercise of ordinary care should have been known by defendant that defendant was negligent.
The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the instruction
was erroneous :
"Effect of this instruction was to tell the jury
that if the floor of the freight car was in an unsafe
or defective condition for loading bricks, there was
negligence upon the part of appellants.
"Whether conduct in a given case amounts to
negligence is ordinarily a question for the jury. In
the controversy at bar, knowledge by appellants that
there were holes in the floor of the car, or the act
of appellants with or without knowledge that it was
in an unsafe condition-if, in fact, it was unsafe._
in furnishing such car, would be evidence of negligence. * * * The error is that the instruction
invades the province of the jury."
In Stevens v. Mirakian, 177 Va. 123, 12 S. E. 2d 780,
a similar instruction was held by the Supreme Court of
Appeals of Virginia to constitute prejudicial error. That
was a suit by an employee against her employer for injuries sustained during the course of her employment. Although not a Federal Employers' Liability case, plaintiff's
recovery was there predicated, as here, upon an employer's
common law duty to exercise reasonable care to provide
a safe place to work. The plaintiff recovered a verdict.
The trial court instructed the jury that if it found that
the plaintiff was performing the duties of her employment
and was injured due to a defective condition of a chair on
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which she was resting then its verdict must be for plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the instruction constituted prejudicial error:
"No instruction was given the jury telling them
that it was essential that the evidence show or tend
to show that the defendant knew or in the exercise
of ordinary care should have known of the defective
condition of the chair and thereafter failed to repair
or remove it from his place of business.
"In this case, knowledge is an essential element
of negligence. * * * We think that an instruction embracing this thought was necessary and
should have been given."
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 7
WHICH INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON A
THEORY CONTRARY TO AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
Instruction No. 7 reads as follows:
"If you find by a preponderance of the evidence
that it was the custom and practice of the defendant
company, through its employees other than the plaintiff, to shut off the steam at the intermediate valve,
or that in the exercise of reasonable care for plaintiff's safety under the circun1stances of this case
it was defendant's dut~· so to do, and further find
from a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant company failed so to do, then you may find
that the defendant company was negligent in this
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regard ; and if you further find from a preponderance of the evidence that such conduct upon the part
of the defendant proximately caused in whole or in
part injuries to the plaintiff, then you should return
a verdict in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant, and award to plaintiff damages as in those
instructions set forth."
This instruction permitted the jury to find that it was
the custom and practice or duty of the defendant company,
under the circumstances of this case, to shut off the steam
at tlle intermediate valve through employees other than
plaintiff. The error is that said theory is not supported
by any competent evidence. There was no evidence offered
or received at the trial proving or tending to prove that it
was the custom and practice or duty of the defendant company, under the circumstances, to shut off the steam at the
intermediate valve through an employee other than plaintiff. A review of the testimony compels this conclusion.
Plaintiff was the first witness called in support of his
case. Plaintiff expressly denied any knowledge of the existence or function of the intermediate valve. There is
nothing in his testimony to establish a custom and practice by defendant or a duty to turn off the intermediate
valve under such circumstances. The pertinent parts of
plaintiff's testimony are as follows (R. 50, 51, 52, 70, 71,
72, 130, 131) :
(Cross-Examination)
"Q. Now, there is another valve, is there not,
Mr. Heywood, which is some distance from this par-
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ticular valve, which is along the line, which is customarily turned off when you work on this hammer,
is it not?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. Isn't it a fact, Mr. Heywood, that on other
occasions when you have worked on this hammer
you have had this particular valve, which is some
distance back, turned off besides having the valve
at the hammer turned off?
"A. No, sir.
"Q.

"A.

Do you know the valve I am speaking of?
Yes, sir.

"Q. And that is a valve that is some distance
away which is called a master valve, I think.
"A. That's right.
"Q. And when you turn that master valve off,
why, then you don't have any steam anywhere near
the hammer on which you are working, do you?
"A. Nowhere in the blacksmith shop.
"Q. In other words-Well, that particular
valve that I am speaking about, that's in the blacksmith shop, comes only to this hammer, does it not?
"A. \Vbich valve are you talking about?
"Q.

north" A.

A valve that is about forty feet to the
No.

''A.

-and up to the top.
(\Vitness shakes head in the negative.)

"Q.

You don't know of such a valve, Mr. Hey-

"Q.

wood?
"A.

I do not.
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"Q. And it isn't a fact that you, on other occasions, along with your helper, have turned off
that valve before you worked on this hammer?
"A. No, sir.
"Q.

And you don't know of such a valve at

"A.

No, sir.

all?
"Q. Isn't there also a valve that comes only
to this hammer that's up near the ceiling?
"A. I do not know of one.
"Q.

"A.

You don't know of that valve?
No, sir.

"Q. (By Mr. Ashton) Then you have no recollection, as I understand it, Mr. Heywood, of a main
steam valve, which is up near where this pipe runs
along the top of the blacksmith shop, which is about
thirty or forty feet to the north of this valve that
you operated?
"A. On the same line?
"Q.

"A.

Yes, sir.
No, sir.

"Q. And you have never worked that particular valve?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. And you have never requested the steamfitters or pipefitters to work that valve for you
when you have worked on this equipment on other
occasions?
"A. No, sir; not on this particular equipment.
"Q.

"A.

That's the equipment I am talking about.
That's right.
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"Q. And you say that it is the rule that this
other valve be turned off?
"A. No, it isn't the rule.
"Q. I understood you to say that was the rule
but not the practice.
"A. No. No, it's-In working a machine, you
generally turn off the valve that shuts the steam to
the machine which you're working.

"Q. I understand that. And are you not also
supposed, according to the rule, to turn off the main
valve which leads steam into that machine?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. And you have never done that?
"A. No, sir. The main valve takes the steam
out of the shop.
"Q. And you don't know the valve that simply
takes the steam a way from this particular machine?
"A. Only that one valve.
"Q.

"A.
"Q.

"A.

Only this one valve?
That's right.
You know of no other?
No, sir."

(Re-direct Examination)
"Q. ::Mr. Heywood, before yesterday, during
the course of the trial, had you ever had knowledge
of another valve, other than the valve that you used
on this occasion, between that valve and the main
shutoff valve that shuts down the whole shop?
"A. No, sir.
"Q.

to you?
"A.

Had you ever had such a valve pointed out
No, sir.
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"Q. The only valve you have ever seen turned
off was this one on that particular machine?
"A. When I was working that particular machine, yes.
"Q. Have you ever seen any other valves
turned off?
"A. There is valves to each one of those steam
hammers, and there is four, and I have had occasion
to have them all turned off.
"Q. You have never seen where the intermediate valve turns off?
"A. No.
"Q. You have never seen them since 1922, the
years you have been there?
"A. No.
"Q.
"A.

And you didn't know they existed?
No."

The second witness who testified for plaintiff was Mr.
Griffiths, a blacksmith in defendant's shop called by plaintiff. The only inference that can be drawn from Mr. Griffith's testimony is that plaintiff should have arranged himself, under the circumstances, to have the valve shut off.
Mr. Griffith's testimony in that connection is as follows
(R. 94, 95) :
"Q. Was the main valve turned off in this case,
do you know?
"A. No, it wasn't.
"Q. In other words, an improper practice was
followed by turning only the valve off by the hammer?
"A. Well, I would say so, yes.
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"Q. And who was the person who turned that
valve off?

"A. Well, I think the proper procedure would
have been for the mechanic working on the job to
notify the foreman that the steam should be turned
off.
"Q. And you know that the steam was not
turned off on this occasion, was it?
"A. No.
"Q. So that in this particular instance, anyway, so far as you are concerned, an improper procedure was followed by not turning off the main
valve of the steam?

"A.

I would say yes to that.

"Q. Now, who is the person who usually determines whether the steam is to be turned offthe mechanic doing the work?

"A. Well. he would naturally be the individual
to determine whether the steam should be turned
off.
"Q. And how does he go to the foreman and
ask that it be turned off?
"A. If I were in his position, that's exactly
what I would do.
"Q.

"A.

Yes. And that was not done in this case.
Not to my knowledge."

The third witness to testify was Joseph L. Crowton,
a pipefitter, called by plaintiff. Mr. Crowton testified that
the intermediate valve would not be used under the circumstances involved in this case.
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Direct Examination (R. 106):
"Q. Now, if work is being done on the pipes
or the fittings on the single arch steam hammer,
what shutoff valve is used, to your knowledge?
"A. The one shown on your photo there, on
your picture there.
"Q. Is there another shutoff valve somewhere
back along that main line?
"A. Yes, sir; about twelve inches, approximately-that could vary a little-from where the
three-inch line takes off of the main six-inch line
in the roof of the blacksmith shop.

Now, what is that shutoff valve used for?
"A. Well, if there's anything needs to be repaired on that line between there and the hammer,
and actually you'd have to shut it off up at the main
steam line, which this valve is located, to work on the
line from there down.
"Q.

"Q. And from the steam valve that is indicated in the photograph, on down, which valve would
be used?
"A. The steam hammer itself, I would say the
valve right there in the picture. It's just close to
the steam hammer."

Redirect Examination (R. 132) :
"Q. Mr. Crowton, yesterday you were asked
some questions by counsel, on cross examination,
pertaining to the possibility of a leak in the valve
that is next to the stuffing box, and what you would
do in case there was such leak. Will you elaborate
on that and explain what you meant?
"A. Yes. The valve down by the hammer, the
one shown on the picture closest to the hammer, I
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said anything that connected directly with the hammer, or smaller pipes, condensate pipes, we call
them, that lead from the hammer down, that would
be all that would be necessary to shut that valve off.
"If you had a pipe you had to screw out directly,
of that valve, it wouldn't be safe to do it, then you
would go to the upper valve shutoff.

"If there was leakage between the lower valve
and the upper valve, you would shut the upper valve
off.
"Quite often the valves leak in the packing
glands in the valves itself. You could not repair that
packing in that valve safely, without going to the
upper valve to turn it off. Other than that I would
say ordinary work on the hammer itself would be
taken care of by just turning the lower valve off.
You wouldn't gain anything by turning the upper
valve off, as far as safety, if the valve was off.
"As long as a valve shuts off tight behind your
work, so you can work, there is no necessity going
along the line shutting all the valves off."
The only other witnesses, except medical, who testified
were two employees called as vd.tnesses by the defendant.
They were Mr. Aberton and Mr. Schenk. Their testimony
does not support the theory contained in said instruction.
In view of the foregoing, it is clear that there was no competent evidence to support the theory contained in said
instruction.
Even assuming, however, that an inference could be
drawn from the testimony to establish the custom and practice referred to in said instruction, the issue should not
have been submitted to the jury. The rule has been well
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settled and frequently stated by this Court that a party is
not entitled to go to the jury on an issue unless that part
of his own testimony or the testimony of his witness which
is least favorable to his contention, is of such a character
as will sustain a verdict in his favor on that issue. Harley
Benson v. The D. & R. G. W. Co., 4 Utah 2d 38, 286 P. 2d
790. Alvarado v. Tucker, 2 Utah 2d 16, 268 P. 2d 986,
Fowler v. Pleasant Valley Coal Co., 16 Utah 348, 52 Pac.
594.
The testimony of the plaintiff and his witness Crowton
positively denied that the intermediate valve would be used
under the circumstances of this case. In view of that testimony and under the foregoing decisions, plaintiff was not
entitled to go to the jury on that issue.

POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 8
WHICH INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON A
THEORY NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
Instruction No. 8 reads as follows :
"You are instructed that an employer has a duty
to inspect equipment used by its employees when it
knows or in the exercise of reasonable care should
have known of an unsafe condition in said equipment.
"If you shall find from a preponderance of the
evidence that defendant knew or in the exercise of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

32

reasonable care should have known when it found
the steam leak that there might be an unsafe condition existing in the steam pipe in the stuffing box,
then you may find that defendant was under a duty
in the exercise of reasonable care to make an inspection of said pipe to determine whether an unsafe
condition actually existed, and if you further find
by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant
failed to inspect said pipe and that such failure to
inspect proximately caused, in whole or in part, injuries to plaintiff, then you should return a verdict
in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant
and award to plaintiff damages as in these instructions set forth."
The theory expressed in this instruction is that the
defendant had a duty to inspect the pipe in question after
a leak was discovered and that if it failed to exercise reasonable care in said inspection it was negligent. Defendant
has no quarrel with the proposition that the defendant had
a duty to exercise reasonable care in making an inspection
of the pipe in question. It is defendant's contention, however, that it fully discharged the said duty.
The testimony should be reviewed to determine what
action the defendant took in discharge of its duty to inspect.
The steam leak in question was discovered on the morning of the accident by lVfr. Griffiths, a blacksmith (R. 87).
Mr. Griffiths promptly notified the Foreman, Schenk, of
the leak (R. 87). Foreman Schenk asked plaintiff to repair
the leak. As previously stated, the plaintiff had worked as
a machinist in the shops since November 19, 1922 (R. 14).
Plaintiff was a trouble shooter (R. 15). The plaintiff had
performed the same type of work on numerous occasions
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(R. 29). It was the testimony of Foreman Schenk that

it was plaintiff's duty in the first instance to determine
what had to be done (R. 151).
The following testimony of plaintiff is important on
the issue of inspection (R. 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 85) :
"Q. Well, don't you inspect work that you do,
Mr. Heywood, to see if you have completed it satisfactorily?
"A. After the job is completed, I always see
that it's okeh.
"Q. In other words, whenever you go to repair
something, particularly something that has to be
taken apart to repair, one of your duties is to inspect the work you do for the purpose of determining whether or not it has been completed satisfactory, isn't it?
"A. That's right, yes sir.
"Q. In other words, that's one of the things
that a mechanic always does when he repairs a
broken part, is to inspect a thing that he's trying
to correct, and inspect the work he's done, for the
purpose of seeing if he has corrected the trouble;
that's right, isn't it?
"A. To a certain extent, that's correct.
"Q. Well, now, Mr. Heywood, when you went
up to look at this particular pipe, you say that you
were engaged as sort of a trouble-shooter, is that
right?
"A. That's right.
"Q. In other words, one of the things you were
to do when they found some trouble was to go up and
find out what the trouble was, was it not?
"A. That's right.
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"Q.

isn't it?
"A.

And then correct the trouble; that's right,
That's right.

"Q. And when you saw this particular pipe,
you say it had a bad leak in it?
"A. Steam leak.

"Q. And when you saw that it had a bad leak
you knew there was something wrong, did you not?
"A. Yes.
"Q. And what are the things that cause pipe
to leak, Mr. Heywood?
"A. As your stuffing box packing has come
loose.

"Q. And if the flange on the pipe concealed in
this stuffing box is also broken, that will cause a
leak, will it not?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Well, did you make any attempt to ascertain whether or not the flange on this particular
pipe was broken at the time you opened it?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. Well, how would you eliminate the possibility of that flange being broken if you made no
attempt to ascertain whether it was broken or not?
"A. Because it just needed new packing.
"Q. 'Veil, then, Mr. Heywood, you say you
made no effort when you \Yere up there to inspect
this particular flange to see if it was broken.
"A. That's right.
"Q. Well, Mr. Heywood, did you make any
inspection to see if that was the condition that was
existing in that pipe?
"A. No, sir.
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"Q. (By Mr. Ashton) Is there ever a better
opportunity to inspect equipment that must be dismantled than when you have it dismantled so that
you can look into it?
"A. That is the opportune time, I guess.
"Q.

"A.

Did you make an inspection at that time?
No, sir.

"Q. Did you ask anybody to make an inspection at that time?
"A. No, sir.
"Q.

wood?
"A.

You just put it back together, Mr. HeyThat's right.

"Q. Do you know anybody down at that shop
who is more qualified to inspect and look at this
equipment for the purpose of determining whether
or not there's some trouble there than you?
"A. That's up to the supervisor.
"Q. No, no. I asked if you know anybody who
is more qualified than you"A. No.
"Q. Did you ever go in to the supervisor on
any occasion and tell him that you think the steamfitter ought to check with you to see if this is okey?
"A. On a lot of jobs, yes, sir.
"Q.

"A.
"Q.

"A.

Did you ever on this job?
No, sir.
On no occasion?
No, sir."

The conclusion is inescapable from the foregoing testimony that defendant exercised all care and prudence which
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could be required of it under the circumstances. The very
purpose for which plaintiff was sent to the single arch
hammer was to determine the cause of the steam leak and
correct it. No one was in a better position to make an
inspection than plaintiff. No other employee possessed the
knowledge that plaintiff did regarding the condition of the
pipe. It was plaintiff who attempted to tighten the flange;
it was plaintiff who replaced the packing. If anyone should
have known of the condition, it was plaintiff. Admittedly,
the plaintiff failed to make the type of inspection required
to determine the trouble. Plaintiff's failure could not furnish the basis for defendant's liability, however.
The novel theory advanced by plaintiff at the time of
trial and incorporated in Instruction Number 8 was that
the defect in question could not have been discovered except
by removing the pipe in question; that the work of removing said pipe was that of a pipe fitter; that an inspection
of said pipe should have been made by a pipe fitter. The
difficulty with this argument is that it ignores the facts.
The evidence is uncontradicted that it was plaintiff's responsibility in the first instance to determine the nature of
the trouble. There is no evidence that plaintiff ever requested or suggested that a pipe fitter inspect the pipe.
Plaintiff admitted that he had made no request for a pipe
fitter. There is no evidence that plaintiff's work had
progressed to the point or that the nature of the trouble
was such that defendant knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known that a pipe fitter was required. Certainly the defendant could not be held negligent
for failure to furnish a pipe fitter in the absence of evidence
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that defendant knew or should have known that a pipe
fitter was required. Defendant had the right to assume
that if a pipe fitter was needed, plaintiff would ask for one.
Plaintiff, who had the burden of proof, offered no
evidence and none was received that it was the custom and
practice to send a pipe fitter in advance of or along with
plaintiff under such circumstances.

POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN ITS REFUSAL AND FAILURE TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 1, 8 AND 11 OR SOME
INSTRUCTION SETTING FORTH IN FULL
THE THEORIES CONTAINED THEREIN.
The only charges given by the Court pertaining to the
defense of contributory ne,gligence are contained in the
court's instructions Nos. 9 and 10. Those instructions are
of limited effect. Instruction No. 9 charges the jury on
the duty of turning off the intermediate valve or requesting
that such valve be turned off. Instruction No. 10 is restricted to plaintiff's duty to discover the defect in the
steam pipe.
Neither of said instructions charges the jury on the
theory that plaintiff had a duty to request and arrange for
a pipe fitter to inspect the pipe and to remove the pipe.
This theory became a very material matter in the trial.
It was plaintiff's contention that the defect in the pipe
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could not have been discovered except by removing the
pipe and that the work of removing the pipe was that of a
pipe fitter. Instruction No. 8, discussed hereinabove, expressly charged the jury on the issue of defendant's negligence in failing to inspect the pipe after the steam leak was
discovered.
It was the defendant's contention that if a pipe fitter

was required to make an inspection or to remove the pipe
that a request should have been made by plaintiff for a
pipe fitter. There was evidence to support defendant's
theory. Defendant's witness, Schenk, testified that between
a machinist and pipe fitter, it was the machinist's job, in
the first instance, to inspect the machine to determine what
had to be done (R. 151, 157). Plaintiff himself testified
that on a lot of jobs he had asked the supervisor to have
a steam fitter check with him (R. 85). Plaintiff admitted
that he had never done so on the occasion in question (R.
85) . In view of the foregoing evidence, defendant was
entitled to have the theory submitted to the jury that plaintiff was negligent in failing to request or arrange for a
steam fitter. The jury might well have found, had the
same been submitted, that plaintiff was negligent in failing
to request or await the assistance of a steam fitter. The
general instructions on contributory negligence requested
by defendant would have covered the said theory. The instructions given by the Court failed to present said theory.
Defendant submits that it was prejudicial error for the
Court to fail and refuse to submit said theory to the jury
either in the requested instructions or in some part of the
charge.
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POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL· ERROR IN FAILING AND REFUSING
TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 6 OR SOME OTHER INSTRUCTION INCORPORATING THE THEORY
CONTAINED THEREIN.
Defendant's requested Instruction No. 6 contains a
correct statement of the law applicable to the facts of this
case. The requested instruction is almost identical with an
instruction which was approved by this court in the recent
case, Bowden v. The Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., supra. The court stated in that decision its recognition of the necessity of actual or constructive knowledge
of an unsafe condition in order to charge the defendant with
liability.
It was particularly important to the defendant under

the facts of this case that the elements set forth in requested Instruction No. 6 be submitted to the jury. The
nature of the equipment and the defects were such that the
jury might well have found that the defendant did not know
and in the exercise of reasonable care would not have known
that an unsafe condition existed. There was abundant evidence from which the jury could have concluded that the
defendant did not know and would not, in the exercise of
reasonable care, have known of an unsafe condition. Defendant was entitled to have this important requisite submitted
to the jury. The Court's charge to the jury, as given, was
devoid of any statement requiring that the jury find that
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the defendant knew or in the exercise of reasonable care
should have known of an unsafe condition. To the further
prejudice of defendant, the Court's Instruction No. 6 expressly eliminated the necessity of such knowledge on the
part of the defendant.
In addition to the Bowden case, the following decisions
hold that knowledge of an unsafe condition is an essential
element of liability under such circumstances.

Seaboard Airline Railway v. Horton, supra,
Atlantic Coastline Railroad Co. v. Dixon, supra,
Hat field v. Thompson, supra,
Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Burks, supra,
Stevens v. Mirakian, supra.
In each of the three latter decisions, the Court held that it
was prejudicial error not to instruct the jury as to the
necessity for finding that the defendant had knowledge of
the defective or unsafe condition. The pertinent parts of
the said opinions are set out above.
It was equally important that the second element set
forth in defendant's requested Instruction No. 6 be given
to the jury. It is not every unsafe condition nor every
defect in equipment which gives rise to liability on the part
of an employer. There are always unsafe conditions existing in industrial shops such as railroad blacksmith shops.
Railroading is itself a hazardous business. Many unsafE
conditions cannot be eliminated even through the exerciSE
of reasonable care. This is particularly true of a defect ir
equipment which arises and is discovered during the coursE
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of its operation as in this case. The law seems well settled
that in order to render a defendant railroad liable for an
unsafe condition, it must be found that the condition gave
rise to an unreasonable risk of harm. This element of liability was recognized by the Court in the Bowden case.
This requirement was not set forth in any of the Court's
instructions to the jury. Defendant contends that it was
entitled to have this theory submitted to the jury.
There can be little controversy over the proposition
that when an unsafe or defective condition not previously
known arises in a piece of machinery or equipment that
.a defendant railroad has a reasonable period of time within
which to correct the condition without subjecting itself to
liability therefor. This element was also included in the
instruction considered by this Court in the Bowden case
.and recognized by the Court as proper. It is particularly
applicable to the facts of this case inasmuch as the condition in the single arch hammer arose during its operation
and steps were taken by the defendant to correct the condition. The Court's instructions to the jury did not set
forth this element.

It is defendant's contention that its requested Instruction No. 6, as a whole, contains a correct statement of the
law and was particularly applicable to the evidence in this
case. Failure to give said instruction deprived defendant
of an important part of its defense. Defendant was denied
the right to have its theory of the case presented to the
jury. The error in failing to give this instruction was aggravated by the Court's Instruction No. 6 which eliminated
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all of the elements set forth in the requested instruction
from consideration by the jury and made the sole issue
whether or not the place of work was unsafe.

POINT VI.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN FAILING AND REFUSING
TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 2.
It was the defendant's theory that the defect which
caused plaintiff's accident and injuries was latent; that
said defect could not have been discovered by the usual
and ordinary examinations employed by railroads in the
exercise of reasonable care. This theory was supported by
competent evidence. Both the plaintiff and other witnesses
testified that the defect could not be discovered except by
disconnecting the pipe into the stuffing box and examining
the same. The defect was in fact not discovered by plaintiff.

Under these circumstances defendant contended that
it was entitled to an instruction charging the jury that it
was not required to employ or adopt extraordinary or unreasonable tests or examinations to discover defects, but
fulfilled its duty by adopting such tests and examination
procedure as ordinarily used by prudently conducted railroads. The purpose of such instruction was to advise the
jury that the railroad was not under a duty to periodically
dismantle and examine extensive steam lines. This theory
was incorporated in defendant's requested Instruction No.
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2. There is authority to support the propriety of such an
instruction :
Texas and Pacific Railroad Co. v. Barrett, 166
U. S. 617, 17 S. Ct. 707,

Lowden v. Hanson, 134 F. 2d 348 (C. C. A. 8th
1943)'
Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Coughlin, 132
Fed. 801 (C. C. A. 6th 1904).
The trial court's instructions to the jury failed to present
this theory. Defendant contends that it was entitled to
have the theory presented either in the form submitted or
elsewhere in the court's charge.

POINT VII.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED
VERDICT; THE EVIDENCE COMPELS THE
CONCLUSION THAT PLAINTIF'F WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW AND THAT
HIS NEGLIGENCE WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS ACCIDENT AND INJURIES.
No useful purpose would be served by repeating or
reiterating the evidence which has been set out above. It
is the defendant's contention that the great weight of the
evidence compels the conclusion that plaintiff was negligent
as a matter of law and that his negligence was the sole
proximate cause of his accident and injuries.
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It is clear from the evidence that plaintiff's accident
and injuries were caused by an old latent defect between
the collar and pipe concealed by the single arch hammer
stuffing box. Defendant discharged its duty to inspect and
correct said condition by sending plaintiff, a trouble shooter,
senior machinist and an experienced employee, to correct
the condition. The failure to correct the condition was
negligence on the part of plaintiff. Plaintiff was in the best
possible position to ascertain the trouble and appreciate
the danger. Plaintiff took it upon himself to turn in the
steam without having corrected or repaired the defect.

Plaintiff attempted to avoid responsibility in this connection by contending that the inspection should have been
made by a pipe fitter. This contention is unworthy of consideration. It is beyond all reasonable standards to require
a railroad to furnish an inspector for an inspector or to
furnish assistance to an experienced employee who has not
requested or made it known that he desires assistance. The
conclusion is therefore inescapable that plaintiff himself
was negligent and that his negligence was the sole proximate cause of his accident and injuries.
In view of the foregoing, the court should have granted
defendant's motion for a directed verdict.
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CONCLUSION
Defendant submits that the trial court committed
trejudicial error in its instructions to the jury and its
ailure to charge the jury in accordance with defendant's
·equested instructions ; that the court erred in denying
Lefendant's motion for a directed verdict. On the basis of
;he foregoing, defendant respectfully urges that the judgnent below be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

VANCOTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY,
LEONARD J. LEWIS,
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON,
Counsel for Appellant.
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